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I. Introduction 
Since the collapse o f  the Berlin W a l l ,  
the m i l i t a r y  force t h a t  h a s  been 
deployed m o s t  frequently by the 
president i n  response t o  international 
cr ises  h a s  been U . S .  special operations 
forces . 1 
United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are in 
high demand.2 Their ability to deploy \\Any Time . . . Any 
Placetr3 wherever they are needed and accomplish national 
objectives makes them more effective than the conventional 
armed forces. Unlike the United States conventional armed 
forces who operate in a large mass and can be easily 
recognized in their traditional uniforms, SOF operate in 
small highly trained units using the element of surprise 
and may not be as recognizable because they may, in 
4 exceptional circumstances, wear nontraditional uniforms. 
SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING u . s . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 250 (1997). 
'William M. Arkin, Secret Soldiers; Will Our Military Be Dominated By 
Forces Shielded From Scrutiny?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 22, 2003, at M1. 
Tom Mowman, Special Forces' Role May Expand, BALT. SUN, Aug. 3 2002, at 
9A. See also TOM CLANCY, CARL STINER, & TONY KOLTZ, SHADOW WARRIORS INSIDE THE 
SPECIAL FORCES 513 (Berkley Book 2003) (2002). 
Motto of the 16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 
available at http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/index2.shtml. (last visited 
June 20, 2003). 
Interview with W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for the Law of War 
Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, in Washington D.C. 
(June 20, 2003). (About ninety-five percent of the time SOF wear 
conventional uniforms). 
1 
Examples of this were seen on the news and in photographs 
shortly after September llth depicting SOF dressed in 
indigenous clothing riding horseback through the 
Afghanistan terrain' communicating information on the 
precise location of the Taliban to B-52 bombers flying at 
36,000 feet. 
Although SOF may be more effective than conventional 
armed forces for certain missions, the unconventional 
operational methods of SOF create a chink in their armor 
not faced by the conventional armed forces. The 
nontraditional attire worn by SOF while operating in enemy 
territory, rather than traditional uniforms, arguably 
result in forfeiture of prisoner of war (POW) status for 
SOF under the law of war. 
Parties to the law of war, "inspired by the desire to 
diminish the evils of wartN6 agreed upon rules that govern 
the conduct of war on land. One of the fundamental rules 
of the law of war is that combatants are required to 
distinguish themselves from civilians to spare the latter 
See photograph of SOF riding horseback in Afghanistan during 
Operation Enduring Freedom, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Nov2OOl/Ollll2-D-OOOOX-OOl.html. 
(last visited June 20, 2003). 
Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Annex Thereto, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. 539, 36 Stat. 2227.2, 2 
A.J.I.L. (1908) Supplement 90-117 (entry into force Jan. 26, 1910, for 
U.S. Nov. 27, 1909 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
2 
from direct attack. Wearing traditional uniforms in 
combat is one way combatants distinguish themselves, but 
not the sole means. Being in uniform also provides 
combatants POW protection for those captured armed forces 
engaging in spying while in enemy territory. 
The law of war implication for SOF operating in 
nontraditional uniforms is that they are spies. A person 
who clandestinely or in disguise gathers or attempts to 
gather information on a targeted country with the intent 
to communicate it back to his own country is a spy. The 
law of war distinguishes spies from lawful combatants. A 
spy who falls into the hands of the enemy is not accorded 
POW status.7 The consequences of being declared a spy are 
serious because historically, armed forces not in uniform 
captured by the enemy often has resulted in their 
conviction for espionage and execution. 8 
Wearing a traditional uniform is not the combatant's 
sole means of distinguishing himself from the civilian 
population. 
in enemy territory should not be declared spies because 
SOF operating wearing nontraditional uniforms 
Hague Regulations, Arts. 29-31, supra note 6 .  
David A. Anderson, Major, USMC, Spying in Violation of Article 106, 
UCMJ: The Offense and the Constitutionality of its Mandatory Death 
Penalty, 127 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
3 
they wear distinctive clothing that distinguishes them 
from civilian populations. 
Part I1 provides background on SOF9 and how it differs 
from the conventional armed forces. The size of the 
United States' armed forces steadily decreased over the 
past decade," while the number of military operations 
significantly increased." 
increased through the years,12 Congress authorized a 
doubling in the budget for SOF for new equipment, and SOF 
are seeking to increase manpower 'to 49,000 active and 
reserve members by the end of" 2004. l3 
will play a larger role. Because of the unique 
The demand f o r  SOF has 
In the future SOF 
The information on SOF is not all-inclusive due to the nature of 
their classified missions and special access programs. There are 
details that are not appropriate for discussion in this forum. 
lo Department of Defense Almanac, Active Duty Military Personnel 
Strength Levels, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/ 
(last visited June 20 2003) (average military end strength in 1990 was 
2,079,000, and in 2000 it decreased to 1,373,000). 
Department of Defense, Morale and Quality of Life Study (Jun. 13, 
2001) (on file with the author) (since 1990 all services have 
experience increased number of deployments: Navy up 52 percent, Army 
up 300 percent, Marine Corps up 300 percent, and Air Force up 400 
percent) . 
l2 Heritage of the Quite Professionals, Air Force Special Operations 
Command, available at http://www.afsoc.af.mil/history/indexl.pdf. 
(last visited on June 20, 2003) (list of contingency operations with 
SOF involvement of the United States since Vietnam: three operations 
in 1975 beginning with the S.S. Mayaguez to 2002 Operation Enduring 
Freedom). Although not listed on the contingency operations website, 
SOF are involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom since Mar. 19, 2003. 
l3 Walter Pincus & Dan Morgan, Congress Supports Doubling Special 
Operations Funding, WASH. POST, June 5, 2003, at A31. 
4 
capabilities of SOF, they are ideally suited for covert 
operations. 
Part I11 examines the law of war, specifically the 
principle of distinction, ruses in war, and POW 
protections. The law of war authorizes combatants to 
participate directly in the armed hostilities. 
Combatants are required to distinguish themselves from 
civilian populations. Wearing uniforms is one way 
combatants distinguish themselves from the civilian 
populations. Ruses in war, however, illustrate that 
combatants are not always required to wear traditional 
uniforms . 
14 
Part IV explores the law of war implication that 
missions conducted by SOF wearing nontraditional uniforms 
is espionage. International law does not prohibit 
espionage, nor does United States domestic law prohibit 
espionage against a target country. 
violation of the domestic law of the country spied on, and 
it may result in criminal prosecution under the captor's 
domestic law of a captured combatant not in uniform. 
Espionage is a 
l4 The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. (1979) 3- 
608, 16 I.L.M. (1977) 1391-441 (entry i n t o  force Dec. 7, 1978, U.S. 
not a party) Art. 43(2), [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
5 
Part V analyzes the status of captured SOF while 
conducting special operations. The discussion concludes 
with an illustration that captured SOF satisfy the 
principle of distinction and as such should be protected 
as prisoners of war. 
11. Special Operations 
A. Organization 
In 1987 Congress mandated the creation of the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) , l5 and it was 
formally activated as a unified command at MacDill Air 
Force Base, Florida, on April 16, 1987.16 The three 
military service components of USSOCOM are the Army 
Special Operations Command,17 the Air Force Special 
Operations Command,'* and the Naval Special Warfare 
''10 U.S.C. § 167. Section 167 was added as part of the 1986 
"Goldwater-Nichols" legislation that restructured the Department of 
Defense . 
l6 TOM CLANCY, CARL STINER, & TONY KOLTZ, SHADOW WARRIORS INSIDE THE SPECIAL FORCES 
511 (Berkley Book 2 0 0 3 )  (2002). 
l7 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2000 12 (2000) 
(headquarters located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 
l8 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2000 13 ( 2 0 0 0 )  
(headquarters located at Hurlburt Field, Florida). 
6 
Command. l9 Army SOF include Special Forces (SF)  , Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Rangers, 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) 
units. 2o 
be divided into two categories: pilots and aircrew, and 
the Special Tactics Group. Navy SOF include Sea Air and 
Land (SEAL) teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle, and Special Boat 
units. 
Air Force SOF include Air Commandos,21 which may 
22 
23 
Special operations 'are operations conducted by 
specially organized, trained, and equipped military and 
paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, 
economic, or informational objectives by unconventional 
military means in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive areas. ,t24 
that is clandestine, covert or low visibility repeatedly 
World events requiring a capability 
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  1 2  ( 2 0 0 0 )  
(headquarters located at Coronado, California). 
2o UNITED STATES PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  1 2  ( 2 0 0 0 )  . 
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  13 ( 2 0 0 0 )  
(comprised of an active special operations wing, two special 
operations groups, a reserve special operations wing, an air national 
guard special operations wing and a special tactics group). 
22 SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING U .  s . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 55 ( 1 9 9 7 ) .  
23 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  13 ( 2 0 0 0 )  . 
24 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION o. 3 -05 ,  DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
1-1 (Apr. 1 7 ,  1 9 9 8 )  [hereinafter JOINT PUB 3-051.  
7 
25 reveal a reliance on SOF to accomplish the missions. 
"Since 1987, SOF has become the force of choice for 
theater CINCs [commander-in-chiefs] and ambassadors; and 
SOF forces [sic] have been involved in virtually every 
contingency operation, as well as thousands of joint 
training exchanges, peacetime engagement activities, and 
humanitarian relief operations. SOF have this 
capability because of their specialized combat training27 
and unique equipment. 28 
B. Characteristics 
SOF are different from the conventional armed forces 
in their size, capabilities, and equipment. They are 
small units of highly organized, trained, and equipped 
forces whose methods of warfare are unconventional. SOF 
25 United States raid to rescue of prisoners of war at Son Tay prison 
near Hanoi, North Vietnam in November 1970  and the rescue attempt of 
hostages held by Iran in April 1 9 8 0 .  
26 TOM CLANCY, CARL STINER, & TONY KOLTZ, SHADOW WARRIORS INSIDE THE SPECIAL FORCES 
521 (Berkley Book 2003) (2002). 
27 See Department of Defense Press Release, Special Briefing on Special 
Operations Forces Capabilities, Dec. 12, 2001, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2OOl/tl2l22OOl~tl2l2sof.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with the author). 
SOF requires "weapons and equipment not standard for other 
Department of Defense" forces. JOINT PUB 3-05, supra note 24, at 1-4. 
8 
represent approximately three percent2' of the total armed 
forces in the United States. Although small as compared 
to the conventional armed forces, SOF have a tremendous 
global span. "In an average week, nearly 5,300 SOF 
personnel were deployed in 64 countries or foreign 
territories. ,130 
SOF tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment 
are unlike the conventional armed forces, which allow SOF 
to do missions the conventional armed forces are not 
prepared or capable of performing.31 Congress identified 
SOF missions in Title 10 United States Code Section 
32 167(j). Because they operate in small units, SOF 
logistical support is extremely small, which permits a 
29  Appendix D Budget and Manpower cited the total manpower end strength 
of SOF for fiscal year 2000 is 45,741 and for fiscal year 2001 is 
45,690. UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2000 93 
(2000). See also supra note 10 for total end strength of armed forces 
for 2000. 
30 WILLIAM S.  COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS ch. 3, at 36 (2001). 
See JOINT PUB 3-05, supra note 24, at vii (deployment of SOF does not 
entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation 
associated with conventional forces). See also William M. Arkin, 
Secret Soldiers; Will Our Military Be Dominated By Forces Shielded 
From Scrutiny?, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 22, 2003, at M1 (discussing 
authorized use of foreign territory by SOF that foreign governments 
denied use to United States conventional forces). 
32 Special operations activities include each of the following insofar 
as it relates to special operations: (1) Direct action. (2) Strategic 
reconnaissance. (3) Unconventional warfare. (4) Foreign internal 
defense. (5) Civil affairs. (6) Psychological operations. (7) 
Counterterrorism. ( 8 )  Humanitarian assistance. (9) Theater search and 
rescue. (10) Such other activities as may be specified by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense. 
rapid deployment capability with virtually no advanced 
warning.33 One of SOF many unique skills is their High 
Altitude Low Opening (HALO)34 and High Altitude High 
Opening (HAHO) 35 parachute jumps. They jump into austere 
and unimproved locations. SOF must be in excellent 
physical fitness to meet the rigorous requirements of 
special operations. 
Operating in conditions and in environments that 
conventional forces do not requires modifications to SOF 
aircraft, such as sophisticated radars, avionics, and 
sensors that permits SOF to fly low and undetected. SOF 
have all weather, 36 day and night capability, 37 and operate 
33  AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-7, SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6 (July 17, 2001) . 
34  SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES REFERENCE MANUAL, ch. 5, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/sof-ref-2-l/SOFREF~Ch5.htm. 
(last visited June 20, 2003) [hereinafter SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
REFERENCE MANUAL, ch. 51 (HALO airdrops are made above 3000 feet above 
ground level where a freefall is planned prior to parachute opening). 
3 5  SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES REFERENCE MANUAL, ch. 5, supra note 34 (High 
Altitude High Opening (HAHO) airdrops are normally made above 10,000 
feet above ground level, but with no freefall, in order to travel long 
distances). 
36 Air Force Special Operations Command, AFSOC's Aircraft, available at 
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/overview/ (last visited June 20, 2 0 0 3 ) .  
Combat Talon I and 11, MC-130E/H, and Pave Low, MH53J/H provide day 
and night, adverse weather capability. 
37The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) focus is on 
night operations. HQ U.S. A m y  Special Operations Command, at Night 
Stalkers 160th SOAR, available at http://www.soc.mil/ (last visited 
June 20, 2003). 
10 
in politically sensitive38 and denied areas.39 They have 
special communications equipment that provides them global 
communication access in hostile environments and are 
equipped with weapons from throughout the world, as well 
40 as other specialized equipment. 
Along with a host of unique equipment facilitating 
SOF operating where conventional forces do not, are their 
nontraditional uniforms’ the wearing of which is usually 
the exception, rather than standard procedure. The 
exception was the procedure during a portion of Operation 
Enduring Freedom due to the request from Northern Alliance 
leaders.41 The nontraditional uniform worn by SOF in 
support of the Northern Alliance ”included the Massoud 
pakol  (a round brownish-tan or gray wool cap) and Massoud 
checkered scarf .“42 SOF also grew beards and long hair. 
The purpose for this attire was to lower visibility of SOF 
3 8  Air Force Special Operations Command, AFSOC’s Aircraft, a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/overview/. (last visited June 20,  2 0 0 3 )  Air 
Force Special Operations Command Combat Shadow flies clandestine, low 
level missions penetrating politically sensitive areas. 
39 Air Force Special Operations Command, AFSOC s Aircraft , a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/overview/ (last visited June 20, 2 0 0 3 ) .  Pave 
Low, MH53J/H, flies undetected penetration into denied areas. 
40 DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA‘S SPECIAL FORCES 88-91 ( 2 0 0 2 )  . 
41 W. Hays Parks, S p e c i a l  Forces‘  Wear o f  Non-Standard U n i f o r m s  In the 
War on T e r r o r i s m ,  U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. 
at 3, on file with author) (in southern Afghanistan, SOF abandoned 
wearing the indigenous attire after three days). 
(forthcoming June 2003)  (manuscript 
42  I d .  
11 
supporting the Northern Alliance, not to appear as the 
local civilians nor blend in with the civilian 
populations. 43 
C .  Training 
SOF are volunteers from the conventional armed 
forces, who first must pass an extensive assessment, 
selection, and training program that is extremely 
demanding both physically and mentally, and lengthy as 
compared to the training of the conventional armed forces. 
The training simulates combat environments through sleep 
deprivation, lack of food, and stressful conditions. The 
attrition rating for the initial training of each of the 
SOF components is high.44 
Army Ranger and Special Forces training is 
challenging; spanning diverse environments from jungle to 
mountain to swamplands.45 The physical challenges, on 
average, result in Ranger students loosing 30 pounds in 
43 I d .  
4 4  SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING U .  S . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 47 (1997); DAVID BOHRER, A M E R I C A ' S  SPECIAL FORCES 17, 48 (2002). Tom 
Mowman, S p e c i a l  Forces '  R o l e  May Expand, BALT. SUN, Aug.3 2002, at 9A. 
45 DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 48 (2 002 ) . 
12 
two months of training.46 In February 1995, four Ranger 
students died during their swamplands training because of 
the harsh environments.47 
is approximately sixty-five percent. 
The attrition rating for Rangers 
4 8  
Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S), the Navy 
SEAL training, is lengthy and demanding too. 4 9  TO prepare 
for the twenty-five week long BUD/S training, which is 
divided into three phases, a volunteer undergoes a seven- 
week pretraining conditioning course first. 50 
begins the first phase of BUD/S consisting of eight weeks 
of stressful physical conditioning that increases the 
level of stress each week.51 The most demanding week of 
BUD/S, designed to push the SEAL trainees to their maximum 
capability, is the final week, known as "Hell Week."52 The 
After that 
4 6  Id. 
47 Id. at 59. 
4 8  DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 48 ( 2 0 0 2 )  ; Tom Mowman, Special  
Forces' Role  May Expand, BALT. SUN, Aug.3 2 0 0 2 ,  at 9A. 
4 9  SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING U. S . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 48 ( 1 9 9 7 )  ; DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 17  ( 2 0 0 2 ) .  
SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING U .  S . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 48 ( 1 9 9 7 ) .  
51 DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 1 7  ( 2 0 0 2 )  . 
52 SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING u . s . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 49  ( 1 9 9 7 )  (trainees are deprived of food and sleep, receiving 
roughly six hours of sleep for the whole week, and upon the conclusion 
of the first phase, a trainee completes phase two, three, and a six to 
eighteen month probationary period. ) ; DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 
1 7  ( 2 0 0 2 ) .  
13 
attrition rating for BUD/S is approximately seventy 
percent. 53 
The counterparts to the Rangers, Special Forces, and 
SEALS are members of the Air Force Special Tactics Group, 
the Combat Control Team (CCT), also known as combat 
control~ers.~~ CCT training consists of "two years of some 
of the most challenging training in the U.S. military . . 
. they [CCTs] attend Air Traffic Control school, Army 
Airborne school, Survival school, Combat Control school, 
Scuba school, and High Altitude Low Opening jump school."55 
The attrition rating for special tactics is approximately 
seventy-seven percent. 56 
53 SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING u . s . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 47 (1997) ; DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 17 (2002) ; Tom 
Mowman, Special Forces' Role May Expand, BALT. SUN, Aug.3 2002, at 9A. 
54 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ (last visited June 20, 2003) 
Combat Control Team: 
A small task organized team of Air Force parachute and 
combat diver qualified personnel trained and equipped to 
rapidly establish and control drop, landing, and 
extraction zone air traffic in austere or hostile 
conditions. They survey and establish terminal airheads as 
well as provide guidance to aircraft for airlift 
operations. They provide command and control, and conduct 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and survey assessments of 
potential objective airfields or assault zones. They also 
can perform limited weather observations and removal of 
obstacles or unexploded ordinance with demolitions. 
5 5  720th Special Tactics Group [720th STG] 'First There", available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/a~ency/usaf/72Ost~.htm. (last 
visited June 20, 2003) (on file with the author). 
56  DAVID BOHRER, AMERICA'S SPECIAL FORCES 103 (2002) . 
14 
SOF are not only in excellent physical fitness, they 
are also mentally fit for the global challenges. SOF 
maintain proficiency in a number of foreign languages, 
and receive regional cultural awareness skills. 58 
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs, SOF deploy to 
foreign countries and train with the host nation's 
troops. 59 




JCET provides invaluable opportunities to 
D. Increase Effectiveness and Efficiency 
SOF have a synergistic affect when used with the 
conventional forces, and they help shape the battlefield.60 
In the Annual Defense Report to the President and the 
Congress, Secretary of Defense William Cohen said SOF 'act 
as force multipliers in support of conventional forces 
engaged in major conflicts, increasing the effectiveness 
57 UNITED STATES PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  8 ( 2 0 0 0 )  . 
5 a  JOINT PUB 3-05,  supra  note 2 4 .  
59 UNITED STATES PECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2 0 0 0  9 ( 2 0 0 0 )  . 
6o AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 - 7 ,  SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6 ( J u l y  1 7 ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  See 
CONGRESS ch. 1 8 ,  at 1 9 3  ( A p r .  1 9 9 7 )  ; WILLIAM S.  COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 
also WILLIAM s .  COHEN, SECRETARY O F  DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ch. 4,  at 51 ( A p r .  1 9 9 8 )  . 
15 
and efficiency of the U.S. military effort."61 
demonstrated this in the opening of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. SOF Pave Low helicopters guided the conventional 
armed forces to the attack on Iraq's air defense radar 
sites, opening the air route for the conventional air 
force to penetrate Iraqi air space. Retired Lieutenant 
Colonel William LeMenager, who flew the first sortie of 
Operation Desert Storm, said, 'We led U.S. Army 10ISt 
Airborne Division (AH-64) 'Screaming Eagle' Apaches into 
Iraq. 
and together we took out the first targets of the war."62 
SOF 
They couldn't have gotten to the target without us, 
In Operation Enduring Freedom, SOF proved again that 
they increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
United States' armed forces. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld said, "the war in Afghanistan has underscored the 
critical contributions that Special Operations Forces make 
in achieving national objectives.N63 
from the 23rd and 24th Special Tactics Squadrons infiltrated 
Combat Controllers 
61 WILLIAM s. COHEN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS ch. 18, at 193 (Apr. 1997). 
6 2  Dennis Brewer, Technical Sergeant, USAF, Operation Desert Storm MH- 
53J Pave Low P i l o t  Retires,  AFSOC NEWS SERVICE NIGHTFLYER, NFNS 03-04 
(Jan. 13, 20031 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  http://www.afsoc.af.mil/nightflyer/ 
(last visited June 18, 2003) (on file with the author). 
63 DONALD H . RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS ch. 5, at 62 (2002). 
16 
by HALO parachute jumps into Afghanistan. 64 
controller, . . . arrived in Afghanistan on Oct. 21 and 
called in airstrikes for 25 straight days, averaging 10 to 
30 per day."65 
air support strikes against the Taliban and a1 Qaeda. 
Combat controllers spotted "targets from horseback using 
laptops and laser goggles"66 equipped with Global 
Positioning System receivers to call in air strikes from 
B-52 bombers and F-16 fighters. Conventional air force 
pilots avoided the danger of enemy air defenses by flying 
at high altitudes. Combat controllers are at a greater 
risk than the conventional air force pilots because they 
are often working in enemy territory while calling in air 
strikes. 
\\One 
One of their missions was to call in close 
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOF entered Iraq well 
over a month before hostilities occurred, "laying the 
groundwork for conventional U.S. forces . . . . "" As it 
was in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in Operation Iraqi 
64 Tamar A.  Mehuron, The Out s tand ing  Airmen, AIR FORCE ASS" AIR FORCE 
MAG., Nov. 2 0 0 2 ,  at 86. 
65 Vernon L o e b ,  An Unlikely Super -warr ior  Emerges i n  A fghan  War; U . S .  
Combat Controllers Guide Bombers t o  P r e c i s i o n  T a r g e t s ,  WASH. POST, May 
19, 2 0 0 2 ,  at A 1 6 .  
66 Ann Scott Tyson, E l i t e  A i r  Force S c o u t s  Brave  F r i e n d l y  F i r e ,  Runaway 
Horses ,  THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 2 7 ,  2 0 0 2  at USA1. 
67 Thomas E .  Ricks, S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  U n i t s  A l r e a d y  i n  I r a q ,  WASH. 
POST, Feb. 13, 2 0 0 3 ,  at A l .  
17 
Freedom SOF led the way into Iraq. On March 19, 2003, 
Wednesday night, 300 SOF infiltrated into western and 
southern Iraq, joining up with other SOF and 
paramilitaries already present, two days before the start 
of the massive air campaign. Their direct action mission 
was to sever the Iraqi military communications, creating 
chaos and confusion, and to seize airfields in western 
Iraq. 69 
E. Special Activities 
Besides SOF support to the conventional armed forces, 
there are particular missions, low visibility, 
clandestine, or covert operations, which are ideally 
suited for SOF. 
covert operations to the President when he determines that 
it 'is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy 
objectives of the United States and is important to the 
national security of the United States, . . . . , r70 After 
the President makes a determination to conduct covert 
Congress delegated the power to conduct 
" Bob Woodward, Attack Was 48 Hours Old When It 'Began', WASH. POST, 
Mar. 2 3 ,  2 0 0 3 ,  at AI. 
69 I d .  
70 50 U.S.C. 5 413b(a) ( 2 0 0 3 )  
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71 operations, he is required to sign a written finding. 
Covert action 'means an activity or activities of the 
United States Government to influence political, economic, 
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that 
the role of the United States Government will not be 
apparent or acknowledged publicly, . . . . Another name 
for covert action is \\special activities. ,,73 
Normally, the CIA conducts special activities, but if 
"the President determines that another agency is more 
likely to achieve a particular objective"74 he may task it. 
The President may task SOF to conduct special activities, 
thereby giving the United States Government plausible 
deniability. Success of SOF special activities depends 
largely on the element of surprise and the frequent use of 
de~eption.~~ 
be executed in a manner that conceals them. To remain 
concealed during the mission, SOF may not be wearing 
75 
SOF infiltration into a hostile country will 
71 Id. 
72 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2003). 
73 Executive Order 12333, § 3.4, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981), 3 C.F.R. 
200 (1982) [hereinafter EO 123331. "Special activities means 
activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives 
abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United 
States Government is not apparent, or acknowledged publicly . . . . I '  
74 Id a t  § 1.8(e). 
75 JOINT PUB 3-05, supra  note 24, at viii and 11-13. 
76 JOINT PUB 3-05, supra note 24, at 1-5. 
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traditional uniforms; instead, they may be dressed in 
subdued uniforms with no indicia of rank, service, or 
nationality or in "civilian clothes."77 
whether SOF conducting these missions wearing 
nontraditional uniforms may, under the law of war, be 
denied prisoner of war (POW) status if they are captured. 
The issue is 
111. International Law of War 
A. Sources of International Law 
International conventions, international customs, and 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations7* 
are "generally regarded as a complete statement of the 
sources of international law. 11 79 
or treaties are bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between states under which states expressly consent to 
conduct their relationships with each other according to 
the terms of the convention or treaty. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as 'an 
international agreement concluded between States in 
International conventions 
77 SUSAN L . MARQUIS, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE : REBUILDING U . S . SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 4 (1997). 
78 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1). 
79 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998) 
20 
written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.rt80 A 
treaty is a contract between states, which governs how the 
states interact with each other. 
A second source of international law, international 
custom, develops from consistent practice of states, when 
the practice is accomplished under a sense of a legal 
obligation, opinio juris.81 A distinct difference between 
treaties and customary international law is that the 
latter can be binding on all states without their consent, 
except for states that persistently object. A third 
source of international law is general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.82 They are principles 
recognized in the domestic law of all civilized states, 
such as yes j u d i c a t a ,  estoppel, justice and equity. 
General principles are not derived from consent of states. 
83 
8 o  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, e n t e r e d  
i n t o  force Jan. 27, 1980. 
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-7 (5th ed. 1998). 
I d .  at 15 
83 I d .  at 17-18. 
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B. Customary Humanitarian Law 
Most societies, going back to ancient times, have had 
some type of rules on armed conflict. 
agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war around the 
year 1400 B.C.84 
King of Babylon provided that "the strong shall not 
oppress the weak" and promised to treat the conquered 
people justly.85 
civilians should be spared the harshness of war. The 
first caliph of Islam, Abu Bakr ( 6 3 2 - 6 3 4 ) , 8 6  issued an 
order to his commanders: "The blood of women, children 
and old people shall not stain your victory. Do not 
destroy a palm tree, nor burn houses and cornfields with 
fire, and do not cut any fruitful tree. 
any flock or herds, save for your subsistence."87 
Egypt made 
The Code of Hamurabi promulgated by the 
Islamic societies recognized that 
You must not slay 
The modern rules, known as the law of war or law of 
armed conflict, have their history in medieval Europe. At 
84 INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 151 (2d ed. 2000) (1987). 
85 See ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, PH.D. , THE CODE OF HAMMLTRABI KING OF BABYLON ABOUT 
2250 B.C. 99 r e p r i n t e d  by WM. W. Grant & Sons Inc. (1994); See a l s o ,  
Christopher Greenwood, H i s t o r i c a l  Development and Legal B a s i s ,  in THE 
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) . 
86 CAESAR E. FARAH, PH.D. , ISLAM BELIEF AND OBSERVANCES 97 (7th ed. 2003) . 
87 Christopher Greenwood, H i s t o r i c a l  Development and Legal B a s i s ,  in 
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 14 
1995). 
(Dieter Fleck ed., 
22 
that time, there were two particular root sources of the 
law of war. One source was the customary law of arms 
developed by the noble class and knights through the 
principles of chivalry. 
law of the church beginning in 500 A.D. The church, 
concerned by the state of violence in war, espoused 
principles for the protection of women, children, and the 
elderly from hostilities. 
The second source was the canon 
88 
Another advocate and writer for \\more humane 
practices'' of civilian populations affected by war was 
Hugo Gr~tius.~' 
on the law of war" who published in 1625 D e  Jure  B e l l i  a c  
P a c i s .  'O 'It is in these writings that we find much of the 
evidence as to what now constitutes the customs of war and 
the customary law regarding armed conflict.',g1 
He is arguably "the earliest modern writer 
C .  Evolution of the Law of War 
The evolution of the law of war progressed 
significantly in the late 1800's. At the Battle of 
Id. 
A r d i  I m s e i s ,  On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 4 4  HARV. INT'L . J .  6 5 ,  a t  8 6  ( 2 0 0 3 ) .  
LESLIE C . GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1 ( 2 d  ed. , 2000)  . 
Id. a t  2 8 .  
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Solferino in 1859, Henri Dunant witnessed the plight of 
40,000 wounded soldiers on the battlefield.92 Many wounded 
soldiers died on the battlefield because there was no 
1863, Henri Dunant founded the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, Switzerland to provide 
better medical care for soldiers wounded in battle.93 The 
ICRC was the impetus for creating an international 
agreement to care for the wounded, the 1864 Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field. The 1864 Geneva 
Convention required the collection and treatment of 
94 wounded enemy soldiers. 
In America in 1863, Doctor Francis Lieber, "a highly 
regarded German immigrant law professor,"95 worked to bring 
order to war. Appointed to a special board, Doctor Lieber 
assisted the Union Army during the American civil War in 
writing a code of regulations for the army.96 On April 24, 
92 Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development  and  Lega l  Basis, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 18 (Dieter Fleck ed., 
1995). 
93 I d .  
94 I d .  
95 RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2 (1983) . 
96 I d .  at 14. 
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1863, President Lincoln approved the final draft General 
Orders, No. 100: Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the FieldIg7 also known as 
the Lieber Code. Although meant as a guide for an 
internal conflict in the United States, the Lieber Code 
had a ”profound effect on the international law of land 
warfare.”98 In the years shortly following the Lieber 
Code, similar “codes were issued by Prussia, 1870; The 
Netherlands, 1871; France, 1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; 
Servia, 1878; Argentina, 1881; Great Britain, 1883 and 
1904; and Spain, 1893.”” Examination of the 1899 Hague 
Convention I1 with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and its successor, the 1907 Hague IV bearing the 
same title, reveals the considerable influence of the 
Lieber Code. 
97 Id. at 15. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, 
reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER‘S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 4 5  
(1983) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE] . 
9 8 R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1 (1983) (“The 
governments of Prussia, France and Great Britain copied it.“). 
99 LESLIE C . GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 30 (2d ed. , 2000) . 
25 
D. International Conventions on the Law of War 
Today a collective body of international law,loO known 
as the law of war, regulates the means and methods of 
warfare and provides protection for victims of war. The 
genesis of the modern law of war can be traced to the 
Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868. Although only one 
page long and created for the purpose of prohibiting the 
use of explosive bullets, the notable provision is in the 
preamble in which nineteen states declared: 
Considering that the progress of 
civilization should have the effect of 
alleviating as much as possible the calamities 
of war; 
~~ 
loo Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Annex Thereto, Oct. 1 8 ,  1907 ,  T.S. 539,  3 6  Stat. 2 2 2 7 . 2 ,  2 
A.J.I.L. ( 1 9 0 8 )  Supplement 90-117 (entry i n t o  f o r c e  Jan. 26,  1910,  f o r  
U.S. Nov. 27,  1 9 0 9  [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 1 2 ,  1949 ,  6 U.S.T. 3114,  7 5  
U.N.T.S. ( 1 9 5 0 )  31-83 1 9 4 9  (entry  i n t o  f o r c e  Oct. 21, 1950 ,  f o r  U . S .  
Feb. 2, 1 9 5 6 )  [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 1 2 ,  1949,  6 
U.S.T. 3217,  7 5  U.N.T.S. ( 1 9 5 0 )  85-133 1 9 4 9  (entry  i n t o  f o r c e  Oct. 21, 
1950,  f o r  U . S .  Feb. 2 ,  1 9 5 6 )  [hereinafter Geneva Convention 111; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
adopted Aug. 1 2 ,  1949 ,  6 U.S.T. 3316,  7 5  U.N.T.S. ( 1 9 5 0 )  135 -285  1 9 4 9  
(entry i n t o  f o r c e  Oct. 21,  1950 ,  f o r  U . S .  Feb. 2,  1 9 5 6 )  [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention 1111; and the 1977  Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Convention of 1 2  August 1 9 4 9  and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted Jun. 8 1977 ,  
1 1 2 5  U.N.T.S. ( 1 9 7 9 )  3-608,  1 6  I.L.M. ( 1 9 7 7 )  1 3 9 1 - 4 4 1  (entry i n t o  
f o r c e  Dec. 7, 1978 ,  U . S .  not a party) [hereinafter Additional Protocol 
11. 
lo’ See Prefatory Note, Declarat ion Renouncing the U s e ,  i n  T i m e  o f  War, 
o f  C e r t a i n  Explos ive  P r o j e c t i l e s  under 400 Grammes Weigh t ,  reprinted 
i n  DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 54 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff ed., 3d 
ed. 2 0 0 0 )  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .  
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That the only legitimate object which 
States should endeavour to accomplish during war 
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to 
disable the greatest possible number of men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable; 
therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity; 
That the employment of such arms would, 
102 
Other international agreements limiting the means of 
warfare soon followed the Saint Petersburg Declaration. 
Fifteen European states gathered for a conference in 
Brussels in 18741°3 where they drafted fifty-six articles, 
known as the Project of an International Declaration 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War. The Brussels 
Declaration of 1874 echoed the language in the Lieber Code 
and the Geneva Convention of 1864. Although this 
declaration was never ratified,lo5 it influenced many of 
lo2 Id. at 55. 
lo3 LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 31 (2d ed., 2000) ; 
See also Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, at 88 (2003). 
lo* Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War, Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, Art. 13(f) [hereinafter 
Declaration of Brussels], reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2d rev. ed. 1981). 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 243 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff ed., 3d 
ed. 2000) (1982). 
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the subsequent international agreements on the laws and 
customs of war. 106 
In 1899 twenty-six countries met at the First Hague 
Peace Conference and "adopted Conventions and Declarations 
which underlie that part of the law of armed conflict 
still known as the Law of The Hague."107 
Hague Peace Conference of 1907, forty-four states 
attended.lo8 The conference resulted in the adoption of 
thirteen conventions and one declaration on the laws of 
war. log The First World War revealed inadequacies in these 
past conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, 
which led to the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War. 'lo 
World War \\also confirmed the need to revise and extend 
the law of war."111 From 1945 through 1948, experts from 
various states met, consulted, and drafted conventions 
At the Second 
The events of the Second 
Ardi Imseis, O n  the F o u r t h  Geneva Convention and the Occupied  
P a l e s t i n i a n  T e r r i t o r y ,  44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, at 88 (2003). 
Io7 LESLIE C . GREEN, T H E  CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 33 (2d ed. , 2000) . 
lo* DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 67 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff ed., 3d 
ed. 2000) (1982). 
log Id. 
Id. at 243. 
Id. at 195. 
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that ultimately evolved into the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949. 112 
After the Second World War, warfare changed by 
increased use of unconventional or guerrilla tactics by 
resistance groups. It was argued by some that these 
groups were not adequately protected in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions because they did not meet the criteria of who 
is legally authorized to fight in an armed conflict. 
The Swiss government convened a Diplomatic Conference that 
met from 1974 to 1977, leading to the 1977 Additional 
Protocols I and I1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. '15 
relevant provisions on the issue of the status of SOF in 
nontraditional uniforms captured by the enemy are in the 
Hague Regulations of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949, and Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
114 
The 
'I3 Id. at 419. 
George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L .  42, 43 
(Jan. 2000). (being commanded by one responsible for subordinates, 
having a fixed and distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, 
carrying arms openly, and complying with the laws and customs of war). 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 419 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff ed., 3d 
ed. 2000) (1982). 
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E. Combatants 
The law of war recognizes three groups in combat: 
combatants, non-combatants and civilians. '16 Combatants 
are members of the armed forces who are authorized to 
participate directly in armed ho~tilities''~ against 
another state. Non-combatants, generally are those 
individuals who are members of the armed forces who are 
medical personnel or chaplains. '18 The third group 
consists of the civilian population, or individual 
civilians not taking a direct or active part in 
hostilities. 
The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War define who 
are combatants and what are their rights and obligations. 
Article 1 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention 
states, 
The laws, rights and duties of war apply 
not only to armies, but also to militia and 
LIEBER CODE, Art. 155, supra note 97; Hague Regulation, Art. 3, supra 
note 100; See also Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-combatants, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 66 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43, para. 2, supra note 100. 
Geneva Convention I, Arts. 28, 30; Geneva Convention 11, Arts. 36, 
37; Geneva Convention 111, Art. 33, and Additional Protocol I, Art. 
43, supra note 100. See also Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non- 
Fleck ed., 1995). 
combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 88  (Dieter 
30 
volunteer corps fulfilling the following 
conditions: 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible 
for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem 
recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 119 
These criteria are inherent qualities of armed forces, 
whereas militia and volunteer corps are required to 
satisfy them to be a lawful combatant. I2O The Hague 
Regulations recognized that combatants and non-combatants 
'have a right to be treated as prisoners of war."121 The 
Geneva Convention I11 did not change the criteria of POW 
status from that in the Hague Regulations. 122 Additional 
Protocol I modified the requirement of having a "fixed 
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance" with a 
requirement that combatants distinguish themselves from 
civilians when attacking or in preparation for attack.123 
When combatants are not able to distinguish themselves 
from civilians, they still retain status of combatants and 
Hague Regulations, Art. 1, supra note 100. 
See George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, A1 Qaeda, and the Determination 
of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 at 895 (Oct. 2002). 
Hague Regulations, Art. 3, supra note 100. 
Geneva Convention 111, Art. 4A(1) & ( 2 ) ,  supra note 100. 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43 & 44, para. 3, supra note 100. 
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do not forfeit POW status, provided they carry arms 
openly. 124 
Although the law of war defines who are combatants, 
there is no definition in the law of war of what 
constitutes a uniform. 125 
required to be worn by combatants to avoid violating the 
law of war is an erroneous interpretation126 to Article 
4 4 ( 7 ) ,  which states that "[tlhis Article is not intended 
to change the generally accepted practice of States with 
respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants 
assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party 
to the conflict."127 W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for 
Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the 
Army, noted "State practice and the negotiating record of 
relevant treaties support the wearing of non-standard 
uniforms by some, but not all, special operations forces, 
The view that uniforms are 
124 Additional Protocol I, Art. 44, paras. 3 & 4, supra note 1 0 0 .  
12' W. Hays Parks, Special  Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms In the 
War on Terrorism,  U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript 
at 10,  on file with author). 
lZ6 See Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, 256-257 (1982) (recognizing situations that are not 
violations of the law of war when a combatant cannot distinguish 
himself) . See a l s o  Howard S .  Levie, ed. PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL 
1 TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, VOl. 2:475 (1980). 
127 Additional Protocol I, Art. 43, para. 7, supra note 100. 
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for certain missions or circumstances.N128 Mr. Parks 
pointed out that within the Working Group of Additional 
Protocol I concerns arose that Article 44 might encourage 
the wearing of civilian clothing by uniformed regular 
armed forces. 12' In spite of these concerns, the Working 
Group recognized circumstances where regular armed forces 
are not required to wear the uniform. 130 The ICRC 
Commentary on the Additional Protocol I states: 
Regulars who are assigned to tasks where they 
must wear civilian clothes, as may be the case, 
for example, with advisers assigned to certain 
resistance units, are not required to wear the 
uniform when on such assignments. 
that the possibility for a combatant to 
distinguish himself from the civilian population 
solely by carrying arms openly, also exists for 
members of the regular armed forces, though only 
under the same exceptional circumstances as for 
members of so-called guerrilla forces.13' 
This means 
F. Principle of Distinction 
The purpose of the principle of distinction132 is to 
spare civilians from attack. The intent of Additional 
12' W. Hays Parks, S p e c i a l  Forces' Wear o f  Non-Standard Un i forms  In the 
War on T e r r o r i s m ,  U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003)  (manuscript 
at 1 0 ,  on file with author). 
12' I d .  at 12. 
I d .  at 1 2  n.16. 
131 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on Additional 
Protocol I, Art. 44, 532 .  
132 Codified in part, at Additional Protocol I, Art. 51, para. 2,  supra  
note 100. 
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Protocol I is to strengthen the POW status for irregular 
forces or guerrilla forces. 133 
Article 2 and the Geneva Convention I11 Article 4, 
difficult for guerrilla forces to meet the requirements of 
"having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance" because they usually fight without wearing 
uniforms. Additional Protocol I eliminated the 
requirement of "having a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance," so long as these combatants 
carry their arms openly while attacking the enemy or 
preparing to attack.134 
guerrilla forces in Additional Protocol I is the act of 
carrying arms openly, rather than wearing uniforms. If 
captured, whether or not the guerrilla forces are wearing 
uniforms, they are nevertheless entitled to POW status, so 
long as they carry their arms openly. 
Under the Hague Regulations 
it is 
The distinguishing act for 
135 
A uniform is an ideal way to distinguish combatants 
from non-combatants, but it is not the only way. Rather 
than solely interpreting Article 4 4 ( 7 )  of Additional 
Protocol I as requiring combatants to wear uniforms, the 
See International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol, Art. 44, 522. 
134 Additional Protocol I, Art. 44, para. 3, supra note 100. 
George H. Aldrich, Guerrillas Combatants and Prisoner of War 
Status, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 871 (1982). 
logical argument is that Article 4 4 ( 7 )  reinforces the 
principle of distinction. 
language, such as combatants shall forfeit their POW 
status when they fail to wear uniforms, weighs against the 
view of a mandatory requirement to wear uniforms to retain 
POW status. 
distinguishable when attacking or in preparation of 
attack, so the enemy knows who is friend or foe. 
The absence of mandatory 
The issue is that a combatant must be 
136 
The Lieber Code recognized that it was permissible to 
wear captured enemy uniforms in war. 137 
Lieber Code required "[tlroops who fight in the uniform of 
their enemies"138 to mark the enemy's uniform with 'some 
striking mark or sign . . . to distinguish the American 
solider from the enemy."139 
wearing the enemy's uniform without a distinguished mark 
In combat, the 
Soldiers fighting while 
2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL L A W , ~ T H  ED. 0 1 6 4  a t  4 2 9  (H. L a u t e r p a c h t ,  ed 
1 9 5 2 ) .  
137 LIEBER CODE, A r t .  6 4 ,  supra  note  9 7 .  
138 LIEBER CODE, A r t .  6 3 ,  supra  note  9 7 .  
LIEBER CODE, A r t .  6 4 ,  supra  no te  9 7 .  
c could "expect no quarter,"140 and this was declared 'an act of perfidy by which they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war."141 The Lieber Code recognized "deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary 
means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable 
warfare,"142 but deception is not just when the enemy 
attempts to injure the adversary by clandestine or 
treacherous ways. The gravamen of the offense of perfidy 
lies in the actual fighting while wearing the enemy's 
uniform without distinguishing marks, rather than wearing 
it while not in combat. An adversary wearing the enemy's 
uniform when confronting the enemy, would mislead the 
enemy into the belief there was a situation of protection, 
rather than one of danger. 
The Brussels Declaration of 1874 changed the 
provision of Lieber's Code on use of the enemy's uniform 
by stating that it is forbidden to make improper use of 
the enemy's uniform143 but never defined what is proper 
~~ 
IQO LIEBER CODE, Art. 63, supra  note 97. (soldiers under this 
circumstance would be denied POW status). 
IQ1 LIEBER CODE, Art. 65, supra  note 97. 
IQ2 LIEBER CODE, Art. 101, supra  note 97 
143 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War, Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, Art. 13(f) [hereinafter 
Declaration of Brussels], r e p r i n t e d  i n  DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI T o m ,  THE 




language used in the Brussels Declaration. 144 
open the interpretation that wearing the enemy’s uniform 
was proper use so long as the soldier was not engaged in 
The Hague Regulations of 1907  adopted the same 
This left 
battle. 
The post World War I1 trial of Colonel Otto Skorzeny 
arguably supports the proposition that wearing the enemy’s 
uniform was proper use so long as the soldier was not 
engaged in battle. The War Crimes Commission accused 
Colonel Skorzeny and nine of his men, who were all members 
of the 150th Panzer Brigade, with violations of the law of 
war. 145 
of the enemy’s uniforms by entering into combat disguised 
in the enemy’s uniforms, treacherously firing upon and 
killing the enemy, and participation in wrongfully 
obtaining the enemy‘s uniforms from a prisoner-of-war 
The specification of the charges were improper use 
146 camp. 
Hitler commissioned Colonel Skorzeny to organize a 
141 special operations force, the 150th Panzer Brigade. 
144 Hague Regulations, Art. 23(f), supra note 100. 
14’ Trial Of Otto Skorzeny And Other, 
Ct., Aug. 18th-Sept. gth, 1947), IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 90-92 
(United States Gen. Milit. Gov. 
(U.N. War Crimes Comm‘n, 1949). 
lo6 Id. 
Id at 91. 
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Their mission 'was to infiltrate through the American 
lines in American uniform and to capture . . . three Mass 
bridges at Angier, Amee and Huy respectively."148 The 150th 
Panzer Brigade consisted of volunteers who spoke 
English. 14' In preparation for the mission, they received 
specialized training in English and American cultural 
orientation and were provided with American weapons and 
vehicles. 150 
Colonel Skorzeny abandoned the original mission 
151 because of failure to penetrate the American lines. 
Instead, the 150th Panzer Brigade assumed \\an infantry 
mission to attack towards Malmedy."152 At trial, their 
defense was that they planned to reach their objectives at 
night while in American uniforms, and once detected, 
discard these uniforms and fight in their uniforms. 153 The 
Hague Regulations prohibits the improper use of 'the 
military insignia and uniform of the enemy;"154 however, it 






lS3 Id. at 92 See Notes on the Case. 
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only the improper use. 155 
all charges. r’156 
“All accused were acquitted of 
Another example of ruses used by combatants is the 
disguised British merchant vessels in World War 11. The 
British outfitted merchant vessels with concealed armament 
and Royal Navy crewmen disguised as merchant mariners. 157 
When a German submarine spotted them, the disguised 
merchant vessel let the German submarine fire on them 
first. 158 As the German submarine came into range of the 
merchant vessel, it raised the British battle ensign and 
attacked the German submarine. The British sank twelve 
submarines by this method. 
These cases illustrate that combatants may lawfully 
disguise themselves, so long as when engaged in attacks, 
they are distinguished as combatants. The Colonel 
Skorzeny trial arguably demonstrated that it was not a 
154 Hague Regulations, Art. 23(f), supra  note 100. 
2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,~TH ED. § 164 at 429 (H. Lauterpacht, ed. 
1952). 
156 Trial Of Otto Skorzeny And Other, (United States Gen. Milit. Gov. 
Ct., Aug. 18th-Sept. gth, 1947), IX L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 92 (U.N. 
War Crimes Comm‘n, 1949). 
LCDR Mary T. Hall, F a l s e  Colors  and Dummy S h i p s :  The  Use o f  Ruse  i n  
Naval War fare ,  42 NAV. WAR COLL. REV. 52, at 60 (Summer 1989). 
15’ I d .  
160 I d .  
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violation of the law of war to wear the enemy's uniform 
behind enemy lines. Disguises worn to conceal troop 
movements are lawful ruses, so long as the true colors are 
worn during attacks. The facts in the disguised British 
merchant vessel attacks on German submarines in World War 
I1 also demonstrated that it is not a violation of the law 
of war to be in disguise while not in battle. There the 
ships and crew were disguised concealing their movements, 
but the British merchant vessels raised their true colors 
before attacking. 
All military, including SOF, rely on camouflage, a 
lawful ruse of war, 162 to conceal their movement and 
location. SOF operating at night may be wearing subdued 
clothing, rather than traditional uniforms, to camouflage 
their movements. 
There is a significant record of SOF from various 
nations wearing nontraditional uniforms in international 
armed conflicts and other military operations as ruses. 
"Beginning with Colonel T.E. Lawrence, the celebrated 
163 
16' See LESLIE C .  GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 146 (2d ed., 
2000). 
16' Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 200 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) . 
163 W. Hays Parks, Special  Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms In the 
War on Terrorism,  U . S .  NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript 
at 13, on file with author). 
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Lawrence of Arabia, State practice reflects a tolerance 
bordering on admiration for special forces wearing 
civilian clothing when working with indigenous persons in 
enemy denied areas, whether for intelligence gathering or 
combat operations. 
wearing nontraditional uniforms in military operations 
from 1904 to 1991 have been conducted by the following 
States: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
Japan, Australia, the United States, and Indonesia. 
Examples of State practice of 
165 
H. Perfidy 
Perfidy differs from ruses in war in that perfidy is 
a breach of faith,166 whereas ruses are acts that cause the 
enemy to make mistakes by deliberately deceiving him or 
that cause the enemy to act imprudently without 
necessarily using deception. 167 
illustrated by the tactics of Colonel Skorzeny are 
camouflaging troops and taking advantage of the night, and 
by the British merchant vessels' surprise attacks on the 
Examples of lawful ruses 
16* Id. 
Id. at 15-20. 
166 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol, Art. 3 1 ,  430. 
167 Id. at 441. 
41 
German submarines. Examples of perfidy are combatants 
pretending to surrender who then attack as they move 
civilians to lull the adversary to drop their defenses 
before attacking them. 
Perfidy, codified in Article 23(b) of the Hague 
Regulations, prohibits the treacherous killing or wounding 
of the enemy.168 Article 37 of Additional Protocol I 
developed the prohibition by narrowly defining perfidy 
providing a list of perfidious acts. 16' Article 37 states: 
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture 
an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting 
the confidence of an adversary to lead him to 
believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to 
accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, 
with intent to betray that confidence, shall 
constitute perfidy. The following acts are 
examples of perfidy: 
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under 
a flag of truce or of a surrender; 
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds 
or sickness: 
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant 
status; and 
(d) the feigning of protected status by the use 
of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United 
Id. at 431. 
169 Id. 
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Nations or of neutral or other States not 
Parties to the conflict. 170 
The elements of perfidy are inviting the confidence 
of the enemy, who believes he is entitled to, or is 
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, with 
intent to betray that confidence. 171 Prohibited disguises 
are those used by combatants inviting the confidence of 
the enemy, causing the enemy to believe that he is 
protected under international law, when combatants 
intending to betray that confidence to kill, injure, or 
capture the enemy, and which proximately causes the death, 
injury, or capture. 
Tactics used by the Fedayeen in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom illustrate perfidy because they were disguised as 
civilians during the war and attacked United States armed 
forces after waving white flags pretending to surrender. 
Created in 1994, the Fedayeen, a militia group formed by 
Saddam Hussein's son Uday, 172 engaged in guerrilla warfare 
dressed in black clothing or civilian attire "armed with 
170 Additional Protocol I, Art. 37, supra  note 1 0 0 .  
171 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol, Art. 37, 435. 
17' Peter Baker, U . S .  Forces Rounding Up C i v i l i a n  S u s p e c t s ,  WASH. POST, 
Mar. 31, 2003, at Al. 
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rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 assault rifles. 
The clothing worn by the Fedayeen was not distinctive from 
that worn by the civilian population in the area, thereby 
allowing the Fedayeen to blend in with them. "A man 
dressed in civilian clothes drove a car up to a U.S. Army 
checkpoint near the city of Najaf, waved to soldiers as if 
seeking help and when they drew near blew up his 
vehicle."174 The conduct of the Fedayeen and their attire 
significantly increased the risk that innocent civilians 
would be attacked by United States armed forces defending 
themselves from approaching civilians. 
It is a violation of the law of war to deliberately 
kill, injure, or capture the enemy by using deception to 
instill the confidence of the enemy with the intent to 
betray that confidence, when the enemy is entitled to 
protection under the law of war. 175 It is not perfidy, 
however, if disguises are used to avoid detection or 
176 capture, rather than to kill, wound, or injure. 
173 Michael R. Gordon, Allies Adapt To Setbacks, THE N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
2 7 ,  2 0 0 3 ,  A l .  
17' Peter Baker, U.S. Authorizes Detention of Iraqi Civilians, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 2 ,  2 0 0 3 ,  at A23. 
175 See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 200  (Dieter Fleck ed., 1 9 9 5 )  . 
176 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol, Art. 31, 4 3 5 .  
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I. Ex Parte Quirin et. al. 
Wearing civilian clothes to avoid detection or 
capture, German saboteurs were charged with violations of 
the law of war and executed as a result of a rushed 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that misstates the law 
by its failure to recognize the lawful use of disguises by 
combatants. 177 The U.S. Supreme Court held it was a 
violation of the law of war178 for 'an enemy combatant who 
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the 
purposes of waging war by destruction of life or property, 
. . . .  r'179 The case is unusual not only because the 
holding misstates the law but also because of the speed in 
which the case was processed. Within less than two months 
from landing on the coast, the saboteurs were tried by a 
military commission, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on their 
case, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reviewed the 3000 
page record of the military commission, and six of the 
180 saboteurs were executed. 
177 Ex P a r t e  Quir in  et. a l . ,  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
178 Id. at 46. 
Id. at 31. 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS : THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT (Mar. 2 6, 2 0 02 ) . 
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Richard Quirin and seven others were German saboteurs 
who landed along the Atlantic coast of the United States 
in the summer of 1942. The German armed forces trained 
them at a camp in Brandenburg, Germany, to sabotage the 
United States'war efforts by blowing up key war 
manufacturing plants and transportation infrastructure. 181 
They received training 'in chemistry, incendiaries, 
explosives, timing devices, secret writing, and 
concealment of identity by blending into an American 
background."182 
coast by German submarines. 183 
group that consisted of Ernest Peter Burger, Heinrich Harm 
Heinck, and Richard Quirin. 184 They "landed on a beach 
near Amagansett, Long Island, New York, about 12:lO a.m., 
Two groups infiltrated the United States 
George John Dasch led one 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 1 (Mar. 26, 2002) . Gary Cohen, The 
Keystone Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 49. 
George John Dasch & The Nazi Saboteurs, available at FBI Library, 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm (last 
visited May 23, 2003) (on file with the author). 
183 317 U.S. 1 at 21 (1942). 
317 U.S. 1 at 21 (1942); See also Gary Cohen, The Keystone 
Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 50. 
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June 13, 1942."185 The second group on June 17, 1942, 
landed at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. 186 
They wore German uniforms as they rowed to shore, 
however, upon landing Dasch's team changed into civilian 
clothes and buried the explosives they brought with 
them. 187 
Coast Guardsman to forget he saw them. 188 Dasch and his 
men went to New York City and checked into hotel rooms. 
No sabotage activities were to occur until "[dletailed 
instructions would come at noon on July 4, at the Hotel 
Gibson in Cincinnati. 
A Coast Guardsman came upon Dasch, who bribed the 
189 
On the night of June 14, 1942, Dasch telephoned the 
FBI; he had decided to turn himself in. He told the FBI 
_____ ~~ 
'" George John Dasch & The Nazi Saboteurs, available at FBI Library, 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm (last 
visited May 23, 2003) (on file with the author). 
317 U.S. 1 at 21 (1942); George John Dasch & The Nazi Saboteurs, 
available at FBI Library, 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/nazi/nazi.htm (last 
visited May 23, 2003) (on file with the author). 
317 U.S. 1 at 21 (1942); Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 51. 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL3 13 40, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 2 (Mar. 26, 2002) . Gary Cohen, The Keystone 
Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 51. 
Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 
52. 
Id at 50. 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL3 13 4 0, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS : THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 2 (Mar. 2 6, 2 002 ) . Gary Cohen, The Keystone 
Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 52. 
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”he just arrived from Germany and planned to go to 
Washington, D.C., within a few days to talk to the FBI 
headquarters. ‘t192 Dasch arrived in Washington, D. C. on 
June 18, 1942 and contacted the FBI. “Dasch spoke with 
FBI special agents over the next five days.rt194 By June 
195 27, 1942, the FBI arrested all eight saboteurs. 
The FBI initially assumed that the saboteurs would be 
tried in civil court. lg6 TWO concerns arose over a trial 
in a civil court: an appropriate penalty and disclosure of 
the facts surrounding the capture of the saboteurs. The 
maximum sentence for sabotage was thirty years. lg8 The 
Government had doubts that they could secure a conviction 
because the saboteurs had not committed an act of 
sabotage. ”’ Attorney General Francis Biddle concluded 
that an offense of attempted sabotage would not succeed in 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 2 (Mar. 2 6 ,  2 0 0 2 )  . 
Gary Cohen, The  Keystone Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, F e b .  2 0 0 2 ,  a t  
5 3 .  
I d .  
S a m  Skolnik, D e a t h  S e n t e n c e s  Behind  C l o s e d  Doors, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 
2 0 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  a t  2 0 .  
196 LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS : THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 3 ( M a r .  2 6 ,  2 002 ) . 
I d .  a t  3 - 4 .  
I d .  a t  4 .  
”’ I d .  
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civil court because "the preparations and landings were 
not close enough to the planned act of sabotage to 
constitute attempt. ,,200 
The other concern focused on national security. The 
FBI was praised in the press with having captured the 
saboteurs, when in reality, it was Dasch turning himself 
in that led to the arrest of the others.201 "Also, the 
government did not want to broadcast how easily German U- 
boats had reached American shores undetected."202 
government solved its concerns by using a secret military 
commission to try the saboteurs for offenses of violation 
of the law of war, violation of Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Article of War, and conspiracy to commit the offenses 
charged. 203 
The 
The speed at which the government acted to charge, 
try, convict, review, and execute the saboteurs was 
incredible. The trial commenced on July 8, 1942,204 only 
six days after President Roosevelt issued Presidential 
I d  
'01 Louis F i s h e r ,  B u s h  C a n ' t  R e l y  on the FDR P r e c e d e n t ,  Los ANGELES TIMES, 
D e c .  2 ,  2 0 0 1 ,  at M3. 
'02 LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 3 ( M a r .  2 6 ,  2 0 0 2 )  . 
'03 I d .  at 8 .  
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Proclamation 2561, Denying Certain Enemies Access To The 
Courts of the United Statesr205 and Executive Order 9185, 
Appointment Of A Military Commission. 206 Challenging the 
validity and constitutionality of the military commission 
to try the saboteurs, the defense filed a writ of habeas 
corpus, which the United States District Court, District 
of Columbia, denied on July 28, 1942, at 8 p.m. 207 The 
U.S. Supreme Court, not in session for the summer, 
convened a Special Term on July 29, 1942,208 and heard oral 
arguments at noon and throughout the next day. 209 
31 ,  1942, the Supreme Court, in a p e r  curiam bench 
decision, upheld the jurisdiction of the military 
commission. 210 On August 8, 1942, the government executed 
six of the saboteurs. 
On July 
211 
'04 3 1 7  U.S. 1 a t  2 3  ( 1 9 4 2 )  ; See also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 8 (Mar. 
2 6 ,  2 0 0 2 ) ;  and. 
'05 7 F e d .  R e g .  5 1 0 1  ( 1 9 4 2 ) .  
'06 7 F e d .  R e g .  5 1 0 3  ( 1 9 4 2 ) .  
'07 LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 1 2  (Mar. 2 6 ,  2 0 0 2 )  . 
'08 317  U . S .  1 ( 1 9 4 2 ) .  
'09 LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ORDER CODE RL31340, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS : THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT 1 2  (Mar. 2 6 ,  2 002 ) . 
'lo Id. 
'I1 Id. a t  1 5 .  
50 
On October 29, 1942, the Supreme Court justified its 
oral decision with its written opinion in the saboteurs' 
case. The Court stated, 
It is enough that petitioners here, . . . 
charged with being enemies who, with the purpose 
of destroying war materials and utilities, 
entered, or after entry remained in, our 
territory without uniform - an offense against 
the law of war. We hold only that those 
particular acts constitute an offense against 
the law of war which the Constitution authorizes 
to be tried by military commission. 212 
The Court correctly held that the military commission had 
jurisdiction, but it incorrectly held that these 
particular acts constituted an offense against the law of 
war. 
The Court erred when it stated that '[bly passing our 
boundaries for such purposes [destroying war materials and 
utilities] without uniform or other emblem signifying 
their belligerent status, or by discarding that means of 
belligerents subject to trial and punishments."213 To 
support its determination, the Court cited to Article 1, 
Annex to the Hague Convention IV of October 18, 1907, that 
'12 317 U . S .  1 at 46 (1942). 
'I3 Id. at 37. 
51 
By analogy, the Court said defined lawful belligerents. 
a lawful belligerent is entitled to POW status; therefore, 
the United States recognized a class of unlawful 
belligerents that is not entitled to POW status. The 
Court cited to the Lieber Code, Article 83, to support the 
view that a belligerent found disguised within the lines 
Lastly, the Court is a violation of the law of war. 
cited to cases from the late 1700’s and late 1800’s of 
belligerents in disguises, specifically civilian dress, 




The Court failed, however, to address Article 24 of 
the Hague Regulations that authorizes ruses in war “and 
the employment of measures necessary for obtaining 
information about the enemy and the country . . . . 
The Court failed to discuss Article 101, which 
acknowledges “deception in war is admitted as a just and 
necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with 
II 217 
”* Id. at 34. 
215 Id. at 32. 
’I6 Id. at 31. 
217 Hague Regulations, Art. 24, supra note 100. See also, Richard 
Baxter, So-called ’Unprivileged Belligerency’ Spies, Guerrillas, and 
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 330 (1951). 
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honorable warfare,"218 so long as it is not an act of 
perfidy. 
saboteurs never obtained or endeavored to obtain 
information in the zone of operations, which is a critical 
element of being a spy. 
The Court failed to consider or ignored that the 
219 
The cases the Court cited as examples of offenses 
against the law of war are distinguishable from the facts 
in the Q u i r i n  case because the offenders in those cited 
cases committed hostile acts or overt acts in furtherance 
thereby, allowing a successful conviction based on a 
charge of attempt. 
charged and convicted with violation of the law of war, 
the men came aboard a ship in the port of Panama while 
disguised as "peaceful to seize the ship for 
the Confederate forces. In another case, John Y. Beall 
was charged and convicted with violation of the laws of 
war when he came aboard a merchant ship at a Canadian port 
disguised in civilian dress and seized it. 221 
In the case of T.E. Hogg and others, 
Robert C. 
218 LIEBER CODE, Art. 101, supra note 97. See also, Richard Baxter, So- 
Called ' Unprivileged Be1 l igerency ' Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 
28 BRIT. Y.B. I N T ' L  L. 323, 331 (1951). 
Hague Regulations, Art. 29, supra note 100. See also Gary Cohen, The 
Keystone Kommandos, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 50 (saboteurs were 
to focus on establishing cover and refrain from any sabotage until 
further detailed instructions were to come on July 4). 
220 317 U.S. 1 at 31 (1942). 
221 Id. 
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Kennedy was charged and convicted with a violation of the 
law of war for his attempt to set fire to the City of New 
York while in disguise. 222 William Murphy was charged and 
convicted with a violation of the law of war "for coming 
within the lines and burning a United States steamboat and 
other property. r '223  
The distinction in the Q u i r i n  case is no hostile act 
was committed by any of the men, nor was any overt act 
committed in furtherance of the act of sabotage. The men 
merely landed on the coast, buried their uniforms and 
explosives, and checked into hotel rooms awaiting detailed 
instructions before commencing any act of sabotage. 
Although the law of war requires a lawful combatant to 
'have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance,"224 it does not expressly state failure to wear a 
uniform while crossing enemy lines is a violation. Today, 
a combatant who fails to distinguish himself while 
attacking or in preparation of attack, however, "shall 
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war.rt225 
222 Id. 
223  Id. 
224 Hague Regulations, Art. 1, supra note 100. 
2 2 5  Additional Protocol I, Art. 44, para. 4, supra  note 100. 
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J. Prisoners of War 
As a general rule, lawful combatants who fall into 
226 the hands of the enemy are entitled to POW status. 
Lawful combatants are individuals authorized by the 
227 parties to the conflict to engage in armed hostilities. 
For example the United States armed forces are lawful 
combatants because the United States, a party to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, authorizes them to engage in 
226 Hague Regulations, Art. 3, "The armed forces of the belligerent 
parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of 
capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of 
war." Geneva Convention 111, Art. 4A, 
Prisoners of war, in sense of the present Convention, are 
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who 
have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict, as well as members of militia or volunteer corps 
forming part of such armed forces. 
( 2 )  Members of other militias and members of other volunteer 
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, 
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside 
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, 
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance ; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43, para. 2, "Members of the armed forces 
of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they 
have the right to participate directly in hostilities. Additional 
Protocol I, Arts. 44, para. 1, "Any combatant, as defined in Article 
43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner 
of war." supra  note 100. 




armed hostilities, thereby being entitled to POW status. 
A1 Qaeda, a non-state terrorist group and not a party to 
any of the international laws of war, are not lawful 
combatants, therefore, they have no POW status. 228 
A contentious issue, however, is the combatant and 
POW status of the Taliban militia. One view perhaps is 
that the Taliban militia are lawful combatants entitled to 
POW status because they were the armed forces, who 
exercised effective control of Afghanistan, as the de 
f a c t o  government. 229 
militia are unlawful combatants not entitled to POW status 
because they are not and never claimed to be the 
Afghanistan government or its armed forces, and they were 
not recognized by the international community to be the 
Afghanistan government. 
The better view is that the Taliban 
230 
'The armed forces of the belligerent parties . . . 
have a right to be treated as prisoners of war."231 
there is any doubt as to whether an individual belongs to 
If 
See George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, A1 Qaeda, and the Determination 
of Illegal Combatants, 96 A.J.I.L. 891, 893 (Oct. 2002) 
229 Id. at 895. 
230 W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms In the 
War on Terrorism, U . S .  NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript 
at 8, on file with author)("The Taliban was never permitted to 
represent Afghanistan at the United Nations or in other international 
fora. The U . N .  Security Council never recognized Taliban as the 
representative of Afghanistan."). 
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the categories entitled to POW status under Article 4 of 
the Geneva Convention 111, the detaining party shall treat 
him as a POW until a competent tribunal determines his 
status. 232 Additional Protocol I of 1977 supplemented this 
with a presumption of POW status for individuals who take 
part in hostilities and are subsequently captured by the 
hostile party. 233 
The detaining power is responsible for the POW and 
must provide for humane treatment while holding him in 
custody. 234 
POW. First, a combatant receives immunity for combat 
action conducted within the limits of the law of war, such 
as killing and destroying property, which otherwise would 
be criminal acts. Second, prisoners of war are accorded 
rights, namely 'to be treated humanely and to be detained 
for no purpose other than to prevent them from rejoining 
the fight . 
There are two important benefits of being a 
231 Hague Regulations, Art. 3, supra note 100. 
232  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 5, supra note 100 
233 Additional Protocol I, Art. 45, supra note 100. 
234 Geneva Convention 111, Arts. 12 and 13, supra note 100. 
235 Albert J. Esgain and Waldemar A. Solf, The 1949 Geneva Convention 
R e l a t i v e  t o  the Treatment o f  Pr isoners  o f  War: I t s  Principles, 
Innovat ions ,  and Deficiencies, 41 N . C .  L. REV. 537, 538 (1963). 
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Because detention of prisoners of war is to prevent 
them from rejoining the fight, rather than punishment for 
fighting, prisoners of war enjoy other benefits when they 
are taken into custody. First, prisoners of war are no 
longer a lawful target. 236 Second, they may not be 
subjected to torture or medical or scientific 
experiments. 237 Third, prisoners of war are entitled 'to 
respect for their persons and their honour. t f 2 3 8  Fourth, 
they are to be provided free of charge shelter, food, 
clothing, and medical care. 239 Fifth, prisoners of war are 
to be evacuated from the combat zone as soon as 
possible. 240 Sixth, they are allowed to worship freely. 
Seventh, prisoners of war are permitted to send 
immediately upon capture letters directly to family 
informing them of their capture. 242  Additionally, a POW 
shall be allowed to send no 'less [sic] than two letters 
241 
236 Hague Regulations, Art. 23(c) and Additional Protocol I, Art. 41, 
supra  note 1 0 0 .  
237 Id. 
238 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 14, supra  note 100. 
239 Geneva Convention 111, Arts. 25, 26, 27, and 30, supra  note 100. 
240  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 19, supra  note 100. 
241 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 34, supra note 100. 
242 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 70, supra  note 100. 
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and four cards monthly,'' 243 and is entitled to receive 
mail. 244 
Along with these benefits accorded a POW, he also has 
a general obligation to obey "the laws, regulations and 
orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining 
Power."245 The detaining power can hold a POW accountable 
through judicial or disciplinary proceedings for offenses 
committed by him against these laws, regulations and 
orders. 246 
The Geneva Convention I11 provides judicial 
procedural due process safeguards for prisoners of war 
accused of offenses. 
miniature Bill of Rights that accord protections for all 
prisoners of war who face prosecution. 247 
post f a c t o  provision forbids the detaining power from 
trying or sentencing a POW for an act that was not 
forbidden by its laws or by international law. 
Prisoners of war have a right against self-incrimination; 
These safeguards are equivalent to a 
~n analogous ex 
248 
243 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 71, supra note 100. 
244 Id. 
2 4 5  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 82, supra note 100. 
246  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 82, supra note 100. 
247 Geneva Convention 111, Arts. 99 - 108, supra note 100 
248 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 99, supra note 100. 
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the detaining power may not use coercion to induce a POW 
to admit guilt. 249 
specification of the charge or charges against him, 
communicated to him in a language that he understands. 
He is entitled to a prompt trial; however, there is no 
definition of what equates to a prompt trial. 




The Geneva Convention I11 has other safeguards to 
ensure a fair trial. A POW accused of a crime has the 
right to be represented by a "qualified advocate or 
counsel."253 He has a right to call witnesses and is 
entitled to the services of a competent interpreter.254 
His defense counsel is granted time, at least two weeks 
before the trial begins for preparation, and a place to 
prepare for trial. 255 The preparation period, however, is 
actually longer because at trial the detaining power must 
offer evidence that the accused POW, his representative, 
249  Id. 
Geneva Convention 111, Art. 104, supra  note 100. 
251 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 105, supra  note 100. 
252 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 103, supra  note 100. 




and the Protecting Power received notice of trial at least 
three weeks in advance. 256 
A POW who is convicted and sentenced to confinement 
receives credit for time served if he was placed into pre- 
trial confinement. 257 "He shall be fully informed of his 
right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within 
which he may do so .  Sentences are enforceable after 
they are pronounced on the POW,259 and the detaining power 
is authorized to detain the POW, even if hostilities have 
ended and the POW is designated for repatriation. 260 These 
are a few of the benefits accorded to prisoners of war. A 
spy, however, is not entitled to POW status, if captured 
while acting as a spy. 261 
IV. Espionage and International Law 
Espionage is not prohibited under international 
law,262 and neither is it a violation of the law of war,263 
256  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 104, supra note 100. 
257 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 103, supra note 100 
258 Geneva Convention 111, Art. 106, supra note 100 
2 5 9  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 108, supra note 100. 
2 6 0  Geneva Convention 111, Art. 115, supra note 100. 
Hague Regulations, Arts. 29 - 31, and Additional Protocol I, Art. 
46, para. 1, supra note 100. 
262 Richard Baxter, So-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, 
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 329 (1951); Roger 
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rather it falls within legitimate ruses of war. 264 
24 of the Hague Regulations states, "Ruses of war and the 
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information 
about the enemy and the country are considered 
permissible. J,265 
Article 
Spying is the secret collection of information by a 
person about a state with the intent to communicate the 
information to a party hostile to that state. 266 Secret 
collection means "acting clandestinely or on false 
pretenses, . . . . Additional Protocol I, Article 
46(2), defined a spy in the negative stating a member of 
the armed force that "gathers or attempts to gather 
information shall not be considered as engaging in 
D. Scott, Commander, USN, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence 
Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 217 (1999). 
263 International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the 
Additional Protocol, Art. 44, 540. 
264 Richard Baxter, So-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, 
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 330 (1951). 
265  Hague Regulations, Art. 24, supra note 100. 
LIEBER CODE, Art. 88, supra note 97, defined a spy as "a person who 
secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks information with 
the intention of communicating it to the enemy." The Hague 
Regulations, Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Art. 29, supra note 100, modified the definition by including 
the location of where the information is obtained: 'in the zone of 
operations. " 
267 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War, Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, Art. 19 [hereinafter 
Declaration of Brussels], reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2d rev. ed. 1981) . 
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espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his 
armed forces."268 Acting in the open, rather than acting 
with deception or in disguise, shields the individual from 
being labeled a spy. 
The consequences for those caught spying can be 
harsh; historically it was death.269 The individual who is 
caught and labeled a spy is subject to the domestic laws 
of the spied-on state. States impose severe punishments 
as a deterrent because it is difficult for states to 
defend themselves from acts of espionage. 270 The British 
captured Captain Nathan Hale, an American officer in the 
Revolutionary War, behind enemy lines disguised as a 
school teacher. The next day he was hanged.271 Four years 
later, Major John Andre, a British officer, "was captured 
behind the American lines in civilian clothes and hanged 
as a spy. , 272 
Under the law of war, a successful spy, defined as 
one who returns to his unit before being captured, is able 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 46, para. 2 supra note 100. 
2 6 9  David A. Anderson, Major, USMC, Spying in Violation of Article 106, 
UCMJ: The Offense and the Constitutionality of its Mandatory Death 
Penalty, 127 MIL. L .  REV. 1 (1990). 
270 Geoffrey B. Demarest, Lt Col, Espionage in International Law, 24 




to avoid the severe punishment. 273 "A spy who, after 
rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently 
captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, 
and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of 
espionage. 1,274 
Despite the severe punishments for espionage under 
domestic state laws, "intelligence activities are now 
accepted as a common, even inherent, attribute of the 
modern state."275 
Collection of information occurs daily through 
observations by people, such as diplomats, through 
electronic eavesdropping by ships off coastal states, and 
through surveillance by aircraft and satellites. 
"[Clovert operations have been widely carried out by 
Western intelligence and "occur with a high 
rate of frequency. 
Spying is a standing practice of states. 
ti 2-77 
Consequences of espionage in peace are not as severe 
as in war. A diplomat accused of espionage is declared 
273 LIEBER CODE, Art. 104, supra  note 97, and the Hague Regulations, Art. 
31 supra  note 100. 
'I4 Hague Regulations, Art. 31, supra  note 100. 
Geoffrey B. Demarest, Lt Col, Espionage i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law, 24 
DEW. J. INT'L. L .  & POL'Y 321, at 321 (Spring 1996). 
276 Loch K. Johnson, Article:  O n  Drawing a B r i g h t  L i n e  f o r  Cover t  
Opera t ions ,  86 AM. J. INT'L L. 284, 292 (Apr. 1992). Table of reported 
Western Intelligence Operations Since 1945. 
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persona non g r a t a  and sent home. 278 A ship accused of 
eavesdropping while in territorial waters of a coastal 
state loses its right of innocent passage279 and may be 
required to depart. 280 An airplane and aircrew accused of 
spying were briefly detained but ultimately were 
released. 281 
These acts of espionage are no more dangerous to the 
hostile state spied on than missions conducted by SOF 
wearing nontraditional uniforms in a hostile state. The 
probability, however, is extremely high that the hostile 
state that captures SOF in nontraditional uniforms will 
accuse them of being spies. 
Surveillance by SOF provide critical information 
leading to successful missions. SOF special 
reconnaissance missions may occur through the insertion of 
small teams in nontraditional uniforms who gather 
information to help shape the battlefield before the 
277 I d .  at 284. 
278 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, 22 U.S.T. 3227; 
T.I.A.S. 7502; 500 U.N.T.S. 95 Art. 9. 
279 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adop ted  Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 19(2) (c) [hereinafter Law of the Seal. 
Law of the Sea, Art. 25(1), supra  note 279. 
United States Navy EP-3E detained by the China on Apr. 1, 2001, and 
the aircrew was released Apr. 11, 2001, a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news~stories/ep3-china- 
06.html (last visited June 20, 2003). 
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commencement of hostilities. These covert SOF missions 
have severe implications if SOF are captured wearing 
nontraditional uniforms. 
A detaining power arguably could declare under these 
circumstances that the captured SOF are spies denying them 
POW status,282 subjecting them to trial for espionage, and 
exposing them to a death sentence. The question presented 
by the scenario is what protection, if any, is accorded to 
spies. 
A literal reading of Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention IV seems to indicate that a spy is a protected 
person in the convention. 283 The issue is clarified in 
Article 5 of the convention, which denies the rights and 
privileges of the convention to individual protected 
persons "suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to 
the security of the State, . . . . "284 The action of the 
United States denying POW status to members of a1 Qaeda in 
the armed conflict in Afghanistan illustrates a category 
of persons, illegal combatants, not protected under the 
Hague Regulations, Arts. 29 - 31, and Additional Protocol I, Art. 
46, para. 1, supra note 100. 
283 Richard Baxter, So-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, 
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L . 323, 328 (1951). 
2a4 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 5, supra note 100; Richard Baxter, So- 
Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 
28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L . 323, 328 (1951). 
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law of war. 285 
status, they are entitled to humane treatment under 
customary international law. 
Although the United States denied them POW 
286 
V. Analysis 
The aim of the law of war is to make war more 
civilized and facilitate the restoration of peace. 
law of war recognizes three groups: combatants, non- 
combatants and civilians. combatants are authorized to 
participate directly in armed hostilities, whereas non- 
combatants and civilians are not. combatants must 
distinguish themselves from civilians, so the latter are 
not made the object of military attacks. 
The 
Wearing traditional uniforms is one way to 
distinguish combatants from the civilian population, but 
the law of war does not expressly require uniforms to be 
worn. 
of the armed forces of a State or militia or volunteer 
corps, is that combatants are commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed and 
What is required by the law of war, whether members 
285 George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, A1 Qaeda, and the Determination of 
Illegal Combatants, 9 6  AM. J. INT'L L .  8 9 1  a t  8 9 2  ( O c t .  2 0 0 2 ) .  
286 Id. a t  8 9 3 .  
67 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their 
arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war. 201 
SOF are organized, trained, and equipped combatants 
called on to execute special missions that require a low 
profile to avoid escalation, or to get in and get out of 
enemy territory without detection. 
SOF may not be wearing traditional uniforms so as to 
conceal their movements and avoid detection while in enemy 
territory. Their small size also allows SOF to avoid 
detection as compared with a large conventional force. 
Their training in unconventional operational methods, such 
as night HALO or HAHO parachute jumps, facilitates SOF 
infiltration into hostile or denied areas without being 
detected. Their equipment consists of highly modified 
aircraft with sophisticated radars, avionics, and sensors 
that allow SOF to conduct all-weather operations, 
especially night operations, to conceal their missions. 
During these missions, 
Threats to the national security of the United States 
often cannot be resolved through the political, economic, 
and diplomatic instruments of national power. When that 
happens, use of the armed forces may be the only option. 
2a7 Hague Regulations, Art. 1, and Geneva Convention 111, Art. 4 supra  
note 100. 
68 
Arrival of the conventional armed forces at times is 
enough to persuade a force threatening the United States 
to back down from its hostile posture. 
escalation of hostilities might make it inappropriate to 
deploy the conventional armed forces, or the mission could 
be too sensitive or beyond their capabilities. 
solution is to deploy SOF. 
Risks of 
The 
SOF are authorized by statutes to perform special 
activities when tasked by the President. Congress 
delegated to the President power to authorize the conduct 
of covert action when the President determines it 
"necessary to support identifiable foreign policy 
objectives of the United States and is important to the 
national security of the United States, . . . . 
Although SOF are authorized to conduct these special 
missions, the law of war implication to SOF who are 
captured by the enemy carries serious consequences if they 
I/ 288 
are declared to be spies. 
States have employed spies for centuries and 
regularly engaged in covert operations to provide 
intelligence on the intentions and capability of their 
adversaries. Methods of intelligence collection may occur 
from outside the territory of a state spied on through the 
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use of satellites. When intelligence collection occurs in 
the territory of the state spied on, the violation amounts 
to a trespass. 
International conventions or treaties do not prohibit 
espionage. 289 The Hague Regulations of 1907, Article 24, 
recognizes "[rluses of war and the employment of measures 
necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and 
the country are considered permissible. t r 2 9 0  
Code recognizes that "deception in war is admitted as a 
just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent 
with honorable warfare,"291 so long as there is no 
clandestine or treacherous attempt to injure the enemy. 
State practice supports the proposition that wearing 
nontraditional uniforms in international armed conflict is 
permissible. 292 Even a successful military spy, defined as 
one who returns to his armed forces and is subsequently 
The Lieber 
288 50 U.S.C. 5 413b(a) (2003). 
289  Roger D. Scott, Commander, USN, Territorially Intrusive 
Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 
(1999). 
Hague Regulations, Art. 24, supra note 100. 
LIEBER CODE, Art. 101, supra note 97. 
292 W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms In the 
War on Terrorism, U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript 
at 15-20, on file with author). 
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captured, is rewarded with POW status under the law of 
war. 293 
Combatants falling into the hands of their 
adversaries are accorded POW status under the law of war, 
entitled to protection by the detaining power. 
important benefits of being a POW are (1) the combatant 
immunity for his combat action conducted within the limits 
of the law of war, which otherwise would be criminal acts, 
and (2) that the detaining power must treat prisoners of 
Two 
war humanely. 
SOF are members of the United States armed forces294 
The law authorized to participate in armed hostilities. 
of war defines those who are authorized to participate in 
armed hostilities as combatants. Thus, SOF are lawful 
combatants. Lawful combatants who fall into the hands of 
the enemy are prisoners of war. Therefore, SOF who fall 
into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war. 
SOF should be entitled to POW status even though they 
are captured wearing nontraditional uniforms because their 
nontraditional uniforms are distinct from clothing worn by 
civilian populations, thereby resulting in no increased 
risk of attack on civilians. SOF carry their arms openly, 
293 Hague Regulations, Art. 31, supra note 100. 
294 10 U.S.C. 9 167 
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and their specialized combat equipment is also distinct 
from weapons found in civilian populations. SOF have a 
chain of command responsible for subordinates, and SOF 
conduct operations in compliance with the laws and customs 
of war. 295 Militia members and volunteer corps captured 
while not wearing uniforms are accorded POW status if they 
are commanded by someone responsible for subordinates, 
have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance, carry their arms openly, and conduct operations 
in compliance with the laws and customs of war. 296 If the 
militia and volunteer corps have POW status, despite not 
wearing uniforms, SOF meeting these four criteria should 
have POW status too if captured wearing nontraditional 
uniforms. Therefore, missions conducted by SOF in 
nontraditional uniforms satisfy requirements of combatants 
entitled to POW status under the law of war. 
Spies falling into the hands of their adversaries, 
however, risk forfeiture of their POW status. History is 
filled with cases of charges of espionage, trials, 
convictions and executions of spies. The United States 
295  The policy of the Department of Defense is that the armed forces 
are required to comply with the law of armed conflict, unless 
otherwise directed by competent authorities. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF INSTRUCTION 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, 
Mar. 2 5 ,  2002. 
296 Hague Regulations, Arts.1 and 3, supra note 100. 
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Supreme Court, in Ex P a r t e  Quirin,297 upheld the 
jurisdiction of the military commission that tried, 
convicted, and executed German saboteurs charged with 
espionage, sabotage, conspiracy, and violation of the law 
of war. In a rushed decision, the Supreme Court failed to 
recognize the law of war provisions on authorized ruses 
and deceptions in war. The Court failed to distinguish 
the law of war violation cases it cited to support; the 
holding in the Q u i r i n  case. Perhaps these oversights 
would have been addressed had the Court not rushed to 
issue a decision from the bench immediately after two days 
of oral argument. 
A comparison of the trial of Colonel Skorzeny with 
today's SOF supports the proposition that SOF are not 
spies and should be protected under the law of war. 
150th Panzer Brigade was organized as a small group of 
highly trained and equipped German armed forces to conduct 
a special mission behind enemy lines. 
American language and culture. 
by wearing American uniforms. 
enemy lines as force multipliers for the conventional 
armed forces by creating chaos and confusion among the 
Allies. When captured by the Allies, they were not 
The 
They studied 
They disguised themselves 
They infiltrated behind 
297 317 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 4 2 )  
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labeled as spies and tried for the offense of espionage, 
nor were they charged with violation of the law of war as 
the German saboteurs were in Quirin.298 The Allies charged 
them with the offense of improper use of enemy uniforms, 
and all were acquitted. 
SOF are small groups of highly trained and equipped 
armed forces. They study foreign languages and receive 
regional cultural awareness orientation. 
they disguise themselves by not wearing traditional 
uniforms. They infiltrate behind enemy lines as force 
multipliers for the conventional armed forces to create 
chaos and confusion. Like Colonel Skorzeny and his 
troops, SOF captured by the enemy should be treated as 
prisoners of war and should not be labeled as spies and 
tried for the offense of espionage. 
On occasion, 
VI. Conclusion 
SOF are vital to the national defense of the United 
States, and the role they play today strongly indicates 
the United States will place greater emphasis on them 
tomorrow. Due to the length of time required to train SOF 
and their high attrition in training, SOF cannot be 
298  317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
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developed and created overnight. 
effectiveness and efficiency of the conventional armed 
forces, and are ideally suited to conduct missions that 
the conventional armed forces are not able to perform 
because of their unique organization, training, and 
equipment. Therefore, SOF should be accorded all the 
protections in the law of war accorded the conventional 
SOF increase the 
armed forces. 
One unique SOF characteristic is the nontraditional 
uniforms that on exceptional circumstances may be worn. 
An initial glance at the law of war, may lead one to the 
conclusion that members of the regular armed forces not 
dressed in traditional uniforms captured by the enemy are 
not entitled to POW status and risk being called a spy. 
Examining the law of war in detail, however, demonstrates 
there is no requirement to wear a uniform to be accorded 
POW status. 
SOF conducting special missions dressed in 
nontraditional uniforms should be accorded POW status if 
captured; however, there are limits to their operations. 
It is not a violation of the law of war to use camouflage 
and ruses, and engage in espionage in military operations. 
For instance, the combat controllers in Afghanistan 
wearing nontraditional uniforms have not committed perfidy 
75 
by providing coordinates for aircraft to drop bombs 
because use of nontraditional uniforms only camouflages 
the combat controllers, rather than causing the enemy into 
a false belief he is protected from aircraft bombs. 
SOF using a disguise, however, to blend in with 
civilian populations gaining an advantage that proximately 
causes the killing, injuring, or capturing the enemy is 
perfidy, a violation of the law of war. An illustration 
of perfidy is the tactics, feigning civilian status, used 
by the Fedayeen during Operation Iraqi Freedom to attack 
United States armed forces. 
that do not result in feigning civilian or non-combatant 
status to kill, wound, or capture, are permissible in the 
law of war. 
Combatants using disguises 
There is no requirement in the law of war that 
combatants must wear a uniform, rather the requirement is 
that combatants must distinguish themselves from civilians 
so that civilian populations are not placed at risk of 
attack. The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol I 
and other scholars, recognized circumstances where regular 
armed forces are not required to wear uniforms. 
practice, which forms a basis for determining customary 
State 
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international law, demonstrates wearing of nontraditional 
uniforms in military operations from 1904 to 1991. 299 
Clearly the best way to observe the law of war, 
avoiding risks to civilians from being attacked and losing 
POW status for SOF is for SOF to wear traditional 
uniforms. Reviewing the details of the law of war and the 
details of the military operations, however, demonstrates 
there are circumstances that wearing nontraditional 
uniforms do accord POW status for SOF. 
299  W. Hays Parks, S p e c i a l  Forces’  Wear o f  Non-Standard U n i f o r m s  In the 
War on Terrorism, U.S. NAV. WAR COLL. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript 
at 15-20, on file with author). 
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